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ABSTRACT
Traffic correlation attacks to de-anonymize Tor users are pos-
sible when an adversary is in a position to observe traffic en-
tering and exiting the Tor network. Recent work has brought
attention to the threat of these attacks by network-level ad-
versaries (e.g., Autonomous Systems). We perform a histor-
ical analysis to understand how the threat from AS-level traf-
fic correlation attacks has evolved over the past five years.
We find that despite a large number of new relays added to
the Tor network, the threat has grown. This points to the
importance of increasing AS-level diversity in addition to
capacity of the Tor network.
We identify and elaborate on common pitfalls of AS-aware
Tor client design and construction. We find that succumbing
to these pitfalls can negatively impact three major aspects
of an AS-aware Tor client – (1) security against AS-level
adversaries, (2) security against relay-level adversaries, and
(3) performance. Finally, we propose and evaluate a Tor
client – Cipollino– which avoids these pitfalls using state-of-
the-art in network-measurement. Our evaluation shows that
Cipollino is able to achieve better security against network-
level adversaries while maintaining security against relay-
level adversaries and performance characteristics compara-
ble to the current Tor client.
1. INTRODUCTION
As governments and organizations increase their com-
mitment to mass surveillance and online tracking, the
Tor anonymity network has become the de facto tech-
nology for preserving anonymity and privacy on the In-
ternet with nearly two million daily users [1].
Tor’s popularity has made it a prime target for at-
tacks and also increases the importance of improving
its defenses. In this paper, we focus on a long-standing
class of attacks known as traffic-correlation attacks. In
a traffic-correlation attack, an adversary correlates the
characteristics of traffic (e.g., packet sizes, inter-packet
timings, etc.) entering and exiting the Tor network.
Successfully correlating these flows results in the de-
anonymization of Tor users – i.e., it becomes possible
to identify the destination server being contacted by a
Tor user.
Traffic correlation attacks have been known about for
over a decade [2] but as our study shows, Tor is still
incredibly vulnerable. Worse yet, the recent Snowden
leaks have confirmed that the NSA and GCHQ, in col-
lusion with several Internet Service Providers (ISPs),
have actively been working to implement network-level
attacks in the wild [3, 4, 5]. In order to launch a traf-
fic correlation attack, an adversary needs to be able to
observe network traffic on (1) the path between the Tor
user and the entry (relay) to the Tor network and (2)
the path between the exit (relay) from the Tor network
to the destination server. Such attacks have been shown
to be feasible for both, relay-level adversaries [6, 7, 8]
and network-level adversaries such as Autonomous Sys-
tems (ASes) [2, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13].
While the problem of relay-level traffic-correlation at-
tacks have been mitigated and solutions have been inte-
grated into the current Tor client [14, 15], the problem
of defending against network-level traffic-correlation at-
tacks remains unsolved. While numerous defenses have
been proposed [2, 16, 17, 18], none have been success-
fully adopted in practice. We identify five pitfalls that
render existing AS-aware Tor clients insecure, imprac-
tical, or both. We characterize the impact of these pit-
falls and propose a modified Tor client that is able to
mitigate them.
In this paper we make three major contributions.
Measuring the threat (Section 3). We perform a
current and a historical analysis to understand how the
threat from AS-level adversaries has evolved over the
past five years. From these measurements, we make the
following observations:
• When considering Tor clients used specifically for
the purpose of loading webpages, 31% of the cir-
cuits constructed by the Tor client in our exper-
iments were found to be vulnerable to AS-level
correlation attacks. However, due to aggressive
circuit re-use by the Tor client, 58% of the web-
sites loaded in our experiments were vulnerable to
de-anonymization. When considering Tor clients
used for a mix of applications (Web, BitTorrent,
IRC, email, etc.), 30% of the circuits were found
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to be vulnerable.
• From our historical analysis, we find that the threat
faced by Tor clients has grown. In the context of
clients used for loading webpages, we found the
number of vulnerable circuits used by the client
increased from 38% (2010) to 41% (2015). In the
context of clients used for a mix of applications, we
found the number of vulnerable circuits increased
more drastically – from 21% (2010) to 35% (2015).
These results show that the threat has been in-
creasing in spite of a massive growth in the size of
the Tor network.
Evaluating existing defenses (Section 4). We
identify five pitfalls in the design of AS-aware Tor clients:
(1) a lack of accurate Internet path data, and not con-
sidering (2) the impact of asymmetric routing on the
Internet, (3) the impact of BGP hijack and intercep-
tion vulnerabilities, (4) relay-level adversaries, or (5)
capacity of Tor relays. We characterize how these pit-
falls impact the security and performance of existing
AS-aware solutions.
Improving security and performance of AS-aware
Tor (Section 5). Based on our evaluation, we design
and construct Cipollino, an AS-aware Tor client which
carefully avoids previous pitfalls while improving secu-
rity and performance, compared to the current state-of-
the-art. In particular, we show that only 1.4% of all the
webpages loaded by the Cipollino client were vulnerable
to AS-level attacks, compared to 58% with the vanilla
Tor client. Further, Cipollino reduces the attack sur-
face for relay-based adversaries by 80% relative to the
state-of-the-art AS-aware Tor client (Astoria). Finally,
in terms of performance, the Cipollino client achieves
median page-load times that are seven seconds faster
than the Astoria Tor client and only 1.6 seconds slower
than the vanilla Tor client.
2. BACKGROUND
In this section, we overview the current state of Tor
relay selection and circuit construction algorithms. Then
we present our adversary model which considers active
and passive network-level traffic correlation attacks.
2.1 The Tor anonymity network
Tor is a low-latency onion routing network that cur-
rently consists of 7.1K relays and has nearly two million
daily users [1]. When a user connects to a destination
server via the Tor client, the client typically establishes
the connection using a nested and encrypted three relay
circuit. The first relay, called the entry-relay, commu-
nicates directly with the Tor user. The last-relay, called
the exit-relay, communicates directly with the destina-
tion server. The key idea is that no single relay is si-
multaneously aware of the identities of both, the source
(Tor user) and destination of the circuit.
Tor relay selection. The three relays in a Tor circuit
are selected according to the following constraints [19]:
(1) no relay may be selected twice in the same circuit,
(2) no two relays belonging to the same family (adver-
tised by the relays) may be selected as part of the same
circuit, and (3) no two relays belonging to the same /16
subnet may be chosen as part of the same circuit.
In addition to the above constraints, Tor is (by de-
fault) configured to select an entry-relay from a re-
stricted set of guard relays that are stable and have
good performance metrics. When the Tor client is con-
figured to use guards as entry-relays, it maintains an or-
dered list of guards and selects the first usable (online)
relay in this list to serve as its entry-relay [15]. Guards
help mitigate the threat of relay-level attacks such as
the predecessor attack [20], selective denial-of-service
attacks [21], and relay-level correlation attacks [8]. For
the middle- and exit-relay positions in the circuit, relays
are selected based on their available bandwidths. While
the middle-relay is selected from the set of all available
relays, exit-relays are chosen from a smaller subset of
relays which have an exit flag. Since relays are chosen
with probability proportional to their available band-
widths, the problem of overloading small sets of relays
is avoided.
Circuit construction and usage. Since relays will-
ing to serve as Tor exits have the ability to specify which
ports and IP addresses they are not willing to establish
connections to, not all circuits constructed by a Tor
client are usable for incoming connection requests. To
deal with this, the Tor client pre-emptively constructs
circuits so that at least two are available for every des-
tination port seen in the past hour. This allows connec-
tion requests to be served by existing circuits as soon as
they are received. In the event that the client receives a
request that cannot be satisfied by any available circuit,
it constructs a new circuit using an exit-relay that can
serve the IP and port specific to that request.
2.2 Adversary model
As a pre-condition to launch network-level correla-
tion attacks, an attacker (e.g., an Autonomous System
(AS)) needs to be present on one of the paths entering
the Tor network and one of the paths exiting it. Fig-
ure 1 illustrates this condition. Here, to de-anonymize a
Tor client, an AS needs to be present on one of the solid
path segments and on one of the dashed path segments.
More formally, if PSRC↔EN is the set of ASes on
the forward and reverse paths between the Tor client
(source) and the selected Tor entry-relay and similarly,
PEX↔DST is the set of ASes on the paths between the
selected Tor exit-relay and the destination, then we say
that a Tor circuit is vulnerable to de-anonymization via
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Figure 1: Condition required for launching traffic-
correlation attacks: An AS needs to be present on one
of the two solid path segments – i.e., path segment A
or B – and on one of the two dashed path segments –
i.e., path segment C or D.
traffic-correlation if there is some AS A such that:
A ∈ {PSRC↔EN ∩ PEX↔DST } (1)
An adversarial AS may satisfy Equation ?? through
passive or active means.
Passive adversaries. An AS may find itself in a posi-
tion to launch a traffic-correlation attack simply as a re-
sult of the AS-level topology and the relationships (i.e.,
customer-provider or peer-peer) it shares with other
ASes. In order to defend against attacks from passive
adversaries, it is sufficient to have an accurate snap-
shot of the ASes that occur in the sets PSRC↔EN and
PEX↔DST for each choice of EN and EX. Given this
information, a correlation attack can be avoided by sim-
ply selecting an entry- and exit-relay for which there is
no AS A which satisfies Equation ?? (if such an entry-
and exit-relay combination exists).
Active adversaries. Due to the dynamics and in-
securities of the BGP protocol, ASes may also actively
seek to place themselves in a position to launch traffic-
correlation attacks. For example, an AS may hijack
or intercept traffic sent to the prefix associated with
the client, entry-relay, exit-relay, or destination server.
Such targeted hijacks and interceptions potentially al-
low adversaries to place themselves on any of the four
paths illustrated in Figure 1. Defending against such
adversaries is more challenging due to need for access
to real-time control-plane data to identify AS that are
likely to be hijacking or intercepting traffic. This is in
addition to the snapshots of AS-level paths required for
defending against passive adversaries.
3. MEASURING THE THREAT
In this section we describe our methodology for mea-
suring the potential threat from AS-level adversaries.
We use a combination of live experiments on the cur-
rent Tor network and simulations that capture a variety
of user workloads on snapshots of the Tor network from
2010 to 2016. Table 1 summarizes our experimental
setup.
3.1 Measurement setting
We use a combination of live experiments using VPN
Period Setting Workload Streams
Tested
2016 Live Web model 215K
2016 Simulated mixed model 12M
2010 - 15 Simulated Web model 145M
2010 - 15 Simulated mixed model 1.9B
Table 1: Summary of our experiments to study the
threat posed by AS-level adversaries.
vantage points and simulations to understand the threat
to Tor in practice, at scale, and over time.
In our experiments, we consider the fact that due to
regional differences in AS-level topologies, Tor clients
in different regions face varying levels of vulnerability.
Therefore, we consider Tor client located in ten coun-
tries: Brazil (BR), China (CN), Germany (DE), Spain
(ES), France (FR), England (GB), Italy (IT), Russia
(RU), Ukraine (UA), and the United States (US). This
list of locations was obtained by performing an inter-
section of the countries with the largest number of Tor
users [1] and the countries ranking the lowest on the
Freedom House Internet freedom rankings [22].
Live experiments with VPNs. In each live exper-
iment, Crawler Incantatus [23] (a Selenium based web-
crawler) and the Tor client were used to load webpages
from within each country, using a commercial VPN.
Simulating Tor behavior with TorPS. Since the
VPN vantage points only provide us a limited view
of each country, in our simulations we considered Tor
clients located in 100 of the most popular (in terms of
end-users [24]) ASes in each country.
We use the Tor Path Simulator (TorPS) to analyze
the vulnerability of the Tor network, while considering
the massive growth in the Tor network between 2010
and 2015. TorPS is a realistic Python-based Tor sim-
ulator which uses archives of previously published Tor
server-descriptors and consensuses from the CollecTor
project [25] to model historical states of the Tor net-
work. Given (1) the set of server descriptors corre-
sponding to the period of the experiment and (2) the set
of streams generated by the user (each stream consists
of a set of IP addresses, ports, and connection request
times), the TorPS simulator constructs circuits for each
connection request within the stream, according to a
chosen client model (in our case the vanilla Tor client).
This allows us to predict the relays that would have
been selected by the Tor client, given a specific network
state from the past.
Each experiment was executed in the live or simu-
lated setting in each of the ten countries. Additionally,
the simulations were used to obtain a picture of the
vulnerability of the Tor client based on network states
obtained for the Tor network between 2010 and 2015.
Logs were maintained to track the circuits established
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by the Live or Simulated Tor client.
3.2 Workload models
When the Tor client selects relays for a circuit, it may
only select exit relays that have agreed to transport the
type of traffic to be sent over the circuit (e.g., some
exits restrict commonly abused ports such as port 25 –
SMTP). As a result, the vulnerability of the Tor client
can depend on the applications used by the Tor user.
We consider two different client workloads described be-
low.
Web model. For each experiment using the web
user model, 200 websites were loaded by the Tor client.
The list of 200 websites were dependent on the client
location – i.e., comprised of the local Alexa Top 100
sites [26] and 100 country-specific sensitive (likely to
be blocked or monitored) webpages obtained from the
Citizen Lab testing list repository. In the case of sim-
ulated Tor clients, streams that were used as input to
the TorPS simulator were constructed using the IPs and
ports observed in the live experiments.
Mixed (application) model. For each experiment
considering a mixed user model, we considered clients
that used Tor for a mix of Web, P2P (BitTorrent), e-
mail and IRC chat for an hour long period. The purpose
of these experiments was to understand if the security
of the Tor client was affected when users required con-
nections to non-HTTP(S) ports.
3.3 Identifying vulnerable circuits
To measure the threat posed by network-level attack-
ers, we need to be able to identify the different networks
(i.e., ASes) traversed by packets sent between the Tor
entry- / exit-relay and client / destination server. How-
ever, ISPs generally treat their routing information and
relationships as trade secrets, making predictions based
on simulations inaccurate. To mitigate this problem,
we use a novel path prediction toolkit – PathCache [27].
The main idea behind PathCache is to perform AS-level
path prediction by utilizing existing publicly available
measurements obtained from data-plane measurement
platforms such as RIPE Atlas [28], iPlane [29], CAIDA
Ark [30], and control-plane measurement platforms such
as RouteViews [31], RIPE RIS [32], and many others.
In the remainder of our experiments, we consider a
circuit constructed by a Tor client to be vulnerable if
the set of ASes A in Equation ?? is non-empty. Here,
we use the PathCache framework to identify the ASes
on PSRC↔EN and PEX↔DST .
3.4 How vulnerable is the Tor client to AS-
level adversaries?
M1: Measuring vanilla Tor’s vulnerability to AS-
level adversaries (web model). In this experi-
ment we measured the fraction of vulnerable circuits
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Figure 2: Per-country breakdown of fraction of vulner-
able websites and circuits [M1].
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Figure 3: Per-country break down of fraction of vulner-
able circuits found to be vulnerable with the Web and
mixed user models. [M2].
constructed by the vanilla Tor client and the fraction of
websites that use one of these vulnerable circuits. The
results, for each of the ten countries, are illustrated in
Figure 2. The experiments were conducted using a VPN
vantage point in each of the ten countries, while loading
200 webpages (from each).
Observation: While only 31% of the circuits con-
structed by the Tor client are vulnerable to AS-level
adversaries, we find that due to aggressive circuit re-
use and concentration of websites in a few ASes, that
a larger fraction (58%) of all websites loaded by the
clients end up using a vulnerable circuit.
M2: Measuring current vulnerability to AS-level
adversaries (mixed model). In this experiment we
measured the fraction of vulnerable circuits constructed
by the vanilla Tor client when it was used for a mix
of loading webpages, sending email, communicating via
IRC chat, and downloading files using BitTorrent. The
results for each of the ten countries are illustrated in
Figure 3. The experiments were simulated using the
TorPS simulator and a user model based on streams
generated by the above applications. 100 of the most
populous (in terms of end-users) ASes [24] in each of
the ten countries were selected as Tor client locations.
Observation: We find that although the average vul-
nerability of mixed application clients (30%) in the coun-
tries is similar to web-only clients (31%), the average
vulnerability of clients in DE, FR, and UA are most
affected by considering mixed application traffic. This
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Figure 4: The average, current minimum, and current
maximum fraction of vulnerable circuits constructed by
vanilla Tor when considering web model clients located
in each of ten countries and the Tor network between
2010 and 2015 [M3].
implies that the few exit-relays that allow communica-
tion over non-HTTP(S) ports enable at-least one AS to
perform a traffic correlation attack, given clients located
in these countries.
3.5 How has the vulnerability evolved as the
Tor network has grown?
M3: Measuring historical vulnerability to AS-
level adversaries (web model). In this experiment
we measured the fraction of vulnerable circuits con-
structed by the vanilla Tor client when loading 200 web-
pages from each of our ten countries, while considering
the changing landscape of the Tor ecosystem between
2010 and 2015. In each country we consider clients lo-
cated in the 100 most populous ASes [24]. Figure 4
illustrates our results. Here, we show the average frac-
tion of vulnerable circuits for clients in all 1000 ASes,
the country whose 100 ASes had the least average vul-
nerability (FR), and the country whose 100 ASes had
the highest average vulnerability (CN).
Observation: Most countries have an average of 25-
45% of their circuits remaining vulnerable to AS-level
attackers. China is an exception with an average of 50-
60% of their circuits remaining vulnerable. Further, in
spite of the addition of nearly 6K new relays in the Tor
network (since 2010), the average threat from AS-level
adversaries has grown – from 38% of all circuits being
vulnerable in 2010 to 41% in 2015.
M4: Measuring historical vulnerability to AS-
level adversaries (mixed model). Here, we use
the same settings as experiment M3, only changing the
user model – i.e., while M3 calculated the fraction of
vulnerable circuits for users loading 200 webpages in
each country, here we consider users who perform a va-
riety of non-http(s) related communication via Tor –
e.g., IRC, email, BitTorrent, etc.. The results are illus-
trated in Figure 5.
Observation: We find that the threat faced by clients
that use Tor for a mix of non-Web applications is cur-
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Figure 5: The average, current minimum, and current
maximum fraction of vulnerable circuits constructed by
vanilla Tor when considering mixed application model
clients located in each of ten countries and the Tor net-
work between 2010 and 2015 [M4].
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Figure 6: The growth of the Tor network in terms of
capacity, number of relays, and number of ASes.
rently slightly lower than web-only Tor clients, in gen-
eral. However, the threat has been growing at a signif-
icantly faster rate. We see in the last five years that
the average threat (in terms of vulnerable circuits con-
structed in the course of our experiments) has increased
from 21% to 35%.
Discussion. Our results indicate that the threat from
de-anonymization by AS-level adversaries is significant,
regardless of client location and what the Tor client is
used for (web or mixed models). Although the threat
faced by clients used for non-Web purposes is slightly
lower, we find that it is growing at a faster rate than
Web-only clients. This is due to the small number of
new non-Web supporting exit-relays being added to the
Tor network.
Investigating further into the reason for the growth
of the threat from AS-level adversaries in spite of the
massive growth of the Tor network, we find that while
the network has grown, the diversity of the ASes in the
network has not increased. This is illustrated in Figure
6. Here, we see that while the number of relays in the
network has grown to nearly 250% and the capacity
of the network has grown to over 3000% of their 2010
values, the number of ASes in the network has lagged
behind (growing to only 160% of its 2010 value).
Take-away: The Tor network faces a fundamental
problem when dealing with AS-level attackers: the lack
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of AS-level diversity in the network. In the absence
of a specific client-based solution for constructing AS-
aware circuits, the threat from AS-level attackers is only
expected to increase.
4. PITFALLSOFAS-AWARETORCLIENTS
In this section we survey previous work to identify five
common pitfalls (P1 - P5) in the design and construc-
tion of AS-aware Tor clients. We empirically demon-
strate the negative consequences of each.
4.1 Inaccurate path predictions (P1)
The core component of any AS-aware Tor client is
its path-prediction toolkit. The Tor client must ac-
curately identify ASes on the paths from and to the
selected entry- and exit-relays to build circuits that
avoid network-level correlation attacks. Designers of
AS-aware clients have three main options for predicting
paths between pairs of ASes:
Data-plane measurements: Data-plane measure-
ment tools such as traceroute allow measurement of
exact paths between a source and destination host. How-
ever, this requires control of the source host, which may
not always be possible (e.g., it is not possible to tracer-
oute between the exit-relay and destination server) and
has a high latency cost, making it infeasible for clients
to perform on-demand.
Control-plane measurements: Paths may also be
obtained via control-plane measurement infrastructure
such as BGP monitors (e.g., RIPE [32], Routeviews [31]).
However, they (like data-plane infrastructure) are lim-
ited by the location and peers of the BGP monitors.
Algorithmic simulations: This approach relies on
several simplified assumptions about Internet routing.
Typically, algorithmic simulators use empirically de-
rived AS-level topologies, inferred inter-AS relationships
(e.g., customer-provider or peer-peer), and a simpli-
fied model of Internet routing policies (e.g., [33, 34]).
While algorithmic simulators are able to predict AS-
level paths between any pair of ASes, their accuracy
compares unfavorably with paths obtained from data-
and control-plane measurements. This is due to the in-
completeness of AS-level topologies and the absence of
ground-truth while inferring AS relationships.
Table 2 illustrates the design choices of previous ef-
forts to measure and defend against threats from AS-
level attackers. Here, we see that all previous work,
with the exception of LASTor [17] and Juen et al.[12]
relied solely on algorithmic path simulators to identify
threatening ASes.
To understand the impact of inaccurate path predic-
tions, we test the accuracy of the state-of-the-art simu-
1The client was not made available by the authors after
multiple requests. We try to objectively evaluate the paper
based on descriptions in the text.
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Figure 7: Number of ASes over or under-estimated by
the state-of-the-art algorithmic simulator [P1].
lator [34] which relies on the Gao-Rexford routing model
[33]. For our experiment, 225 pairs of exit-relay and des-
tination ASes were chosen from the circuits constructed
by the vanilla Tor client in our VPN experiment (M1).
For each pair, a traceroute was executed from the AS
containing the exit-relay (vantage points were obtained
using RIPE Atlas probes). IPs from each traceroute
hop were resolved to their ASes using up-to-date BGP
announcement data to produce AS-level paths. These
AS-level paths were compared with the AS-level paths
obtained by the algorithmic simulator. Figure 7 shows
the result of comparing measured with simulated paths.
We find that straightforward application of simulation
can lead to over estimating the number of ASes present
80% of the time. Worse yet, 40% of the time simulated
paths actually miss ASes contained in the paths, poten-
tially leaving the client vulnerable to traffic-correlation
attacks.
4.2 Ignoring route asymmetry (P2)
Recent work by Sun et al.[13] demonstrated, via high
accuracy AS-level correlation attacks on the Tor net-
work, that the threat from AS-level attackers was higher
than previously anticipated. This is primarily because
of two factors: Adversaries can (1) exploit the asymme-
try of routing on the Internet – i.e., exploit the fact that
their presence on the forward- or reverse-paths at either
end of the network is sufficient to launch an attack and
(2) perform manipulation of routes via BGP hijacks and
interceptions to place themselves on targeted paths. In
this section, we consider the impact of adversaries on
asymmetric routes. In the following section, we discuss
the impact of BGP hijacks on Tor.
From Table 2 we find that the possibility of asym-
metric routes was considered in several previous works.
However, defending against these attackers is challeng-
ing since it requires knowledge of reverse network paths,
many of which cannot be measured directly. This com-
pounds P1 for AS-aware Tor clients as these paths need
to be predicted as well.
We measure the consequences of not considering an
adversary that exploits asymmetric paths. To do so, we
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Path Prediction Approach (P1) Asymmetric
Routes
BGP Insecu-
rities
Relay-level
attacks
Load
balancing
Data-
plane
Control-
plane
Simulations (P2) (P3) (P4) (P5)
Feamster &
Dingledine [2]
X X
√
[35, 36]
√
X X X
Edman &
Syverson [16]
X X
√
[37, 36]
√
X X X
LASTor 1[17] X
√
X X X X X
Johnson et
al.[11]
X X
√
[37, 36] X X
√
X
Juen et al.[12]
√
X
√
[37, 36] X X X X
Astoria [18] X X
√
[33, 34]
√
X X
√
Cipollino [This
paper]
√ √ √
[33, 34]
√ √ √ √
Table 2: Comparison of the measurement methodologies and defense contributions of the state-of-the-art. X indicates
the corresponding criteria was not considered and
√
indicates that it was. (P1-P5)
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Figure 8: Fraction of websites using vulnerable circuits
against a symmetric and asymmetric adversary [P2].
repeat experiment M1, but this time we only consider
an attacker that can exploit only forward paths – i.e.,
we say that a circuit is vulnerable to de-anonymization
if there is some AS A such that: A ∈ {PSRC→EN ∩
PEX→DST }. Figure 8 compares the fraction of web-
sites marked as vulnerable against a forward-path ex-
ploiting (symmetric) adversary model with our (asym-
metric) adversary model. We find that operating under
the assumption of symmetric routing (i.e., considering
only forward-path exploiting adversaries) results in sig-
nificant threat under-estimation, with circuits to 17%
of all websites identified as safe when they were in fact
vulnerable.
4.3 Ignoring active BGP attacks (P3)
The potential for BGP hijacks and interceptions to
compromise Tor traffic was highlighted by Sun et al.[13].
In this section, we measure how vulnerable Tor relays
are to BGP hijacks and interceptions by sets of mali-
cious ASes. For this experiment, we considered 10K
pairs of (source, entry) ASes and 10K pairs of (exit,
destination) ASes. The source ASes were randomly se-
lected from the 1000 popular ASes (100 in each of ten
countries) used in experiments M2-M4 while the entry
and exit ASes were selected from the set of all Tor en-
try and exit relays, respectively. Destination ASes were
randomly chosen from the set of all destination ASes
seen in experiment M1 (when loading 200 webpages in
each of ten countries). For our adversary (i.e., ASes
attempting to launch hijack and interception attacks),
we selected the 16 malicious ASes identified in previous
work [38] as popular ASes for hosting illegal content,
botnet C&C servers, and other malicious resources.
For each pair of ASes we use heuristics from Goldberg
et al.[39] to check which of the 16 malicious ASes is
capable of hijacking or intercepting traffic between the
pair of ASes.
We first characterize the ability of the malicious ASes
to hijack traffic for a chosen path. Figure 9b demon-
strates the hijack and interception success rates of each
of the 16 ASes considered in this experiment. Here
we see that two ASes – ASN 9002: RETN (UA), ASN
29131: RapidSwitch (GB) – achieve high hijack and in-
terception success rate of nearly 50%. The case of ASN
9002 can be explained by its high customer cone size
(3271 customer ASes). On the other hand ASN 29131
is a smaller AS with only one customer AS, however, it
peers with seven other large ASes having an AS rank
under 1K (based on customer cone sizes).
Next we wanted to understand how vulnerable given
Tor relays are to attack. Specifically, Figure 9a shows
the fraction of hijack/interception attempts were suc-
cessful for the relays in ascending order. Each one of
the relays we consider is susceptible to at least 20% of
hijacks and 12% of interception attempts.
4.4 Increasing risk of relay adversaries (P4)
We argue that a client which utilizes a smaller num-
ber of relays to serve connection requests, over a period
of time, is less likely to encounter a malicious relay in
the Tor network. Thus, a Tor client that uses a smaller
number of relays is more secure against adversarial re-
lays.
We observe that many proposed defenses [2, 16, 17,
18] do not consider the impact of AS-aware relay selec-
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Figure 9: Threats from omitting BGP insecurities in
the adversary model [P3].
tion on the security of the client against relay-level ad-
versaries. This is problematic because many AS-aware
clients build circuits on a per-destination basis, as op-
posed to reusing a smaller set of existing circuits. This
results in them leveraging a large set of relays over time.
To illustrate the impact of destination-based circuits,
we conduct an experiment using the Astoria Tor client
[18]. The Astoria Tor client performs on-demand cir-
cuit construction for each new destination AS that it
encounters, while re-using valid (live) circuits for previ-
ously seen ASes. In this experiment, we use our VPN
end points and crawler to load the 200 pages of the
Web user model (i.e., the same settings as M1) using
Astoria and the vanilla Tor clients. We log the number
of unique relays utilized by the Astoria and Tor clients
to serve the page loads. We find that circuits generated
by Astoria utilize nearly five times more relays than the
vanilla Tor client – i.e., Astoria utilized 3,104 unique re-
lays compared to the 623 relays used by the Tor client.
This is a drastic increase in the potential for encounter-
ing malicious relays over the vanilla Tor client.
4.5 Overloading relays in the Tor network (P5)
We find that much of previous work [2, 16, 17] does
not consider the capacities of relays chosen as part of
AS-aware circuits. We argue that relay capacity is im-
portant to consider to prevent custom relay selection
schemes from overloading low-capacity relays and re-
ducing performance across the population of Tor users.
Pitfall Solution
P1. Simulated network paths PathCache empirical data
P2. Ignoring route asymmetry Including reverse paths in
decision making
P3. Ignoring BGP hijacks Realtime BGP data
P4. Increasing risk of relay adver-
saries
Reuse safe circuits between
destinations
P5. Overloading Tor relays Load balance across safe
circuits
Table 3: Overview of how Cipollino mitigates the pit-
falls of prior AS-aware Tor clients.
As an example of the impact of ignoring relay ca-
pacities, Wacek et al.[40] performed a study to analyze
the throughput of various Tor relay selection strategies
and found that: (1) strategies that ignored relay capac-
ities had significant drops in both, client and network
throughput and (2) while LASTor had better perfor-
mance than vanilla Tor when considering round-trip
times on established circuits, the throughput of the
client when used for page loads was 70% less than the
Tor client (compared to 25% more than Tor as demon-
strated in original work by Akhoondi et al.).
The reason for this large disparity in performance re-
ported in the two evaluations is due to Akhoondi et
al.[17] only sending HTTP HEAD requests in their ex-
periments (as opposed to downloading complete web-
pages or documents). In addition to being unrepresen-
tative of typical web traffic, such evaluations do not
sufficiently stress all the relays chosen as part of a cir-
cuit and as a result do not reveal the issues associated
with capacity-agnostic relay selection.
5. THE CIPOLLINO TOR CLIENT
Based on the pitfalls we identified in the prior sec-
tion, we design Cipollino, an AS-aware Tor client that
uses state-of-the-art network measurements and opti-
mizations to mitigate the pitfalls. Table 3 summarizes
how Cipollino addresses each of the pitfalls described
in Section 4. We elaborate on each in the following
sections.
5.1 Improving path prediction (P1)
We reduce our dependence on algorithmic simulators
by using PathCache [27] – a system that aggregates ex-
isting data and control plane measurements to predict
paths. We fall back to simulations only when a path
query cannot be answered using measurement data. Re-
peated querying of the PathCache server every time a
circuit needs to be built is (1) time consuming and (2)
reveals destinations of interest to a third party (e.g.,
PathCache server). To avoid this, the Cipollino client
subscribes to daily updates of the routing graphs main-
tained by the PathCache server and locally computes
paths between ASes. This is beneficial for two other
8
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Figure 10: Number of ASes over or under-estimated
by PathCache, when compared to exact AS-level paths
obtained by traceroutes [P1].
reasons:
1. Offline verification of paths: Since the meta-data
for each edge in the routing graphs maintained
by PathCache includes information regarding the
source of the edge (i.e., to indicate the edge was
observed in a traceroute from the RIPE Atlas net-
work, control-plane data from RouteViews, etc.)
and the measurement ID corresponding to the source.
This is useful for the client to verify the authen-
ticity of of a random subset of the daily updated
paths supplied by the Cipollino aggregator.
2. Low communication overhead: The routing graph
updates are between 5-15 MB/day. This is fea-
sible for clients in most settings. Additionally, it
allows clients to identify safe circuits even if the
PathCache server is not immediately reachable.
To understand the benefits of PathCache, we evaluate
PathCache on two criteria: (1) accuracy of predicted
paths and (2) the fraction of paths where PathCache is
able to answer using empirical data (vs. simulations).
We measure the number of ASes over- or under-estimated
when compared with 225 traceroutes that were not al-
ready aggregated by PathCache. Figure 10 illustrates
the results of this experiment. We find that PathCache
is significantly more accurate than the state-of-the-art
algorithmic simulator (cf. Figure 7). Most importantly,
with 84% of all paths having no missing ASes (no un-
derestimations), PathCache is much less likely to create
vulnerable circuits due to incorrect path predictions.
To understand how often PathCache is able to pre-
dict paths using empirical data, we queried PathCache
for paths between (1) 1,000 source ASes (100 of the
most populous ASes in each of the ten countries) and
the ASes of all entry-relays in the Tor network (265K
path queries) and (2) between the ASes of all exit-relays
in the Tor network and all the destination ASes seen in
our 2,000 web-page loads (312K path queries). Table 4
shows the percentage of paths that were predicted by
PathCache using empirical data. Here we see that Path-
Cache is able to achieve reasonable coverage when con-
N Coverage (Percentage)
SRC ↔ EN EX ↔ DST
10 36.6 34.0
25 32.1 32.4
50 27.6 31.3
100 23.2 29.4
Table 4: Percentage of paths predicted by PathCache
when considering only the top N percentile of relays (by
bandwidth) [P1].
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Figure 11: Per-country breakdown of SRC ← EN and
EN ← SRC paths predicted by PathCache [P1].
sidering high capacity entry- and exit-relays (34-36%).
This implies a higher accuracy of paths predicted for
organically generated Tor circuits, as the Tor client will
tend to use these higher capacity relays.
In Figure 11 we see the per-country breakdown of the
fraction of path requests satisfied by PathCache. Inter-
estingly, we see BR and CN in particular having a very
small fraction of paths between their 100 AS sources
and the Tor entry-relays. We speculate that this is due
to blocking of communication with Tor entry-relays in
these countries. This prevents traceroutes (that Path-
Cache uses as a basis for path prediction) from success-
fully traversing paths from client ASes in these countries
to Tor entry relay ASes.
Depending on client location, PathCache is able to
answer between 15-50% of all queries issued to it by the
Tor client. Importantly, the paths returned for these
queries are unlikely to under-estimate the presence of an
AS. Additionally, coverage increases significantly when
considering higher capacity Tor relays. These factors
make it a good alternative to relying on simulations for
path prediction.
5.2 Considering active adversaries that can ex-
ploit asymmetric routes (P2-P3)
Cipollino considers an adversary model that includes
the possibility of ASes exploiting (1) asymmetric routes
and (2) BGP insecurities. To explain how we deal with
such adversaries, we describe how Cipollino verifies the
safety of a given circuit below.
• Mapping destination IP addresses to ASNs and pre-
fixes: Given a circuit and a destination IP address,
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the Cipollino client first uses an up-to-date offline
IP to ASN database (based off of BGP announce-
ments) to obtain the AS numbers associated with
the network of the client, entry-relay, exit-relay, and
requested destination IP. This database (sourced
and updated by CAIDA) is supplied and updated
by the PathCache daily updates.
Following this, Cipollino generates two pairs of
ASes and two pairs of prefixes – (ASEN , ASSRC),
(ASEX , ASDST ), (PreEN , PreSRC), and (PreEX ,
PreDST ).
• BGP anomaly detection: In order to detect hijacks
and interceptions in near-real-time, Cipollino re-
ceives hourly (customizable in the client configu-
ration) feeds from BGPStream [41] of current BGP
routing anomalies. In particular, BGPStream pro-
duces a live stream of ongoing Multiple Origin AS
(MOAS) anomalies. MOAS anomalies, which oc-
cur when a prefix is being announced by multiple
origin ASes. We use MOAS as an indicator of po-
tentially anomalous routing behavior as a proof of
concept. Beyond the scope of this paper we are
working to develop more accurate detection meth-
ods for hijacks and interceptions which could be
incorporated into Cipollino [42]. This feed of ASes
is used to identify ASes that are likely to be hijack-
ing or intercepting traffic to any of the prefixes in
the previously generated pairs – (PreEN , PreSRC)
and (PreEX , PreDST ).
Any AS X that is suspected to be hijacking or
intercepting traffic to the prefix associated with the
entry-relay is added to the set HEN . Similarly, the
sets HEX , HSRC , and HDST are populated.
• Path prediction: The Cipollino client uses the lo-
cally stored PathCache destination based graphs to
obtain the set of ASes on the SRC ↔ EN and
EX ↔ DST paths. Additionally, the ASes oc-
curring on the paths between HEN ← SRC and
EN ← HEN are added to SRC ↔ EN . This ac-
counts for all ASes that are able to view traffic char-
acteristics in the event of a successful interception
(and hijack) of traffic to EN . The same process is
repeated for HEX , HSRC , and HDST .
• Circuit safety marking: After the paths are com-
puted, a circuit is marked as safe iff the sets SRC ↔
EN and EX ↔ DST have no intersection.
The circuit safety verification procedure shows that
Cipollino does not mark a circuit as safe to serve a given
destination unless there are no ASes that are in a po-
sition to view traffic characteristics at either end of a
circuit, after accounting for route asymmetry and po-
tential hijacks.
5.3 Pre-building and re-using circuits (P4)
To reduce the number of relays it uses, Cipollino
 0
 1000
 2000
 3000
 4000
 5000
Astoria Tor Cip-4 Cip-16 Cip-64
Nu
m
be
r o
f r
el
ay
s
us
ed
 in
 c
irc
ui
ts
Client
Figure 12: Number of unique relays used in circuits
constructed by each client while loading 200 webpages
in each of ten countries [P4].
employs a circuit pre-building strategy similar to the
vanilla Tor client. Cipollino pre-emptively constructs
a fixed (and configurable) number of circuits. In ad-
dition to the benefit of reduced utilization of relays,
two other arguments for pre-emptive circuit construc-
tion come from the following observations drawn from
previous work by Nithyanand et al.[18]:
• For over 50% of all client locations and destination
ASes considered, at-least 50% of all possible entry-
and exit-relay combinations were safe from corre-
lation attacks by AS-level adversaries. Therefore,
by pre-building a number of circuits, we are very
likely to find at least one safe circuit for a given
destination AS.
• Constructing a new circuit is significantly more ex-
pensive than verifying the safety of an existing cir-
cuit – i.e., due to the need for estimating the paths
between all possible (source, entry-relay) and (exit-
relay, destination) pairs. Therefore, by pre-emptively
constructing circuits, Cipollino reduces the need to
construct on-demand destination-aware circuits.
To understand how circuit pre-building affects the
number of relays used by Cipollino, we consider the 200
Web pages loaded in the Web user model with Cipollino
configured to pre-build and always maintain 4, 16, and
64 live and usable circuits. Figure 12 compares the
number of relays used in each setting with the vanilla
Tor client and Astoria. When Cipollino is configured to
only pre-build and maintain 4 active circuits, it utilizes
786 relays (compared to the 623 relays used by Tor).
This is significantly lower than Astoria (3104 relays).
Figure 13 also illustrates that pre-building circuits re-
sults in the need for constructing fewer on-demand and
destination-aware circuits. In this experiment, 1,000
Cipollino clients were simulated (with locations in the
100 most populous ASes in each of ten countries) and
issued connection requests for destinations associated
with 200 country-specific webpages. Here we see that
50% of the clients were able avoid on-demand circuit
construction for at-least 86% of the connection requests,
when just four circuits were prebuilt.
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Reusing circuits, when possible, also improves the
performance of Cipollino as compared with other AS-
aware Tor clients. Figure 14 shows the elapsed time
between the arrival of a connection request and the al-
location of a circuit to satisfy the request. As expected,
since the vanilla Tor client always uses an existing cir-
cuit, it is significantly faster than Astoria and Cipollino,
requiring under .1 seconds to allocate a circuit to over
99% of incoming connection requests. Within the same
time constraints we see that the Cipollino Tor client is
able to satisfy 60% of its requests, while the Astoria
client can only satisfy 21%.
Pre-emptive circuit construction yields two primary
benefits. First, it is responsible for a nearly 80% re-
duction in number of relays utilized by the AS-aware
client (compared to AS-aware clients that do not do
pre-emptive construction), resulting in improved secu-
rity against relay-level adversaries. Second, it results in
reduced circuit allocation times when an existing circuit
is reused.
5.4 Load-balance like Tor when possible (P5)
Load balancing is explicitly performed in two cases:
(1) when constructing and replenishing Cipollino’s re-
serve of pre-built circuits and (2) when there are mul-
tiple safe circuits available for a connection request.
In the first case, Cipollino exactly mimics the load-
balancing approach utilized by the vanilla Tor client
– i.e., relays are selected in a circuit with probability
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proportional to their bandwidth capacity. The second
case, however, is more nuanced. When there are multi-
ple safe entry- and exit-relay options – (en1, ex1), . . . ,
(enn, exn) – Cipollino selects the i
th entry and exit-
relay combination with probability Pri, where:
Pri =
BWeni ×BWexi∑n
j=1BWenj ×BWexj
(2)
Here BWenj and BWexj are the advertised band-
widths of the entry- and exit-relay associated with the
jth safe relay combination. This weighting of combi-
nations works to ensure that each entry- and exit-relay
is selected with the probability proportional to its ad-
vertised bandwidth (when only considering safe relay
options).
Figure 15 compares the effect of the load-balancing
approaches used by the vanilla Tor client, Astoria, and
Cipollino. We find that they are all able to effectively
ensure that relays do not get overloaded. Further, Cipollino
does not perform any worse than Astoria, despite its
reuse of existing safe circuits.
5.5 Putting it all together
In this section we describe the complete architecture
of Cipollino. Finally, we complete our evaluation of
the security and performance of the complete Cipollino
client.
Cipollino architecture. Cipollino consists of three
main components: (1) an AS-level path aggregation
toolkit (PathCache), (2) a circuit allocator, and (3) a
circuit builder. The interaction between each of these
components is illustrated in Figure 16.
The Cipollino client maintains a compact local repos-
itory of destination-based routing graphs. These are
updated by the PathCache servers on a daily (or, con-
figurable) basis. The PathCache path-stitching algo-
rithms are used on these graphs to identify ASes that
are in a position to observe traffic flowing between a
given source and destination AS.
When the Cipollino client receives a request for a con-
nection to a destination IP and port, the circuit alloca-
tor uses the PathCache stitching algorithms and graphs
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Figure 16: Architecture of the Cipollino Tor client.
to identify if there are any pre-built circuits that are
not vulnerable to traffic correlation attacks by ASes. If
exactly one of the safe circuits is able to serve the re-
quested IP and port of the destination, then the circuit
is used to satisfy the connection request. If there are
multiple such circuits, then one of them is chosen in ac-
cordance with our load-balancing scheme described in
the previous section.
In the event that none of the pre-built circuits is able
to satisfy the connection, the circuit builder constructs
a circuit specifically for the requested connection. The
constructed circuit performs also relay selection in a
way that achieves load-balancing across all relays in the
Tor network. Additionally, the circuit builder also han-
dles the worst-case scenario – when there are no safe cir-
cuits that may be built. In this case, the circuit builder
borrows the linear program proposed by the Astoria
Tor client to ensure that no single adversary is able to
de-anonymize a large number of circuits.
Cipollino security against AS-level adversaries.
We compare the security of the circuits constructed by
Cipollino, Astoria, and the vanilla Tor client while per-
forming 200 page-loads performed in each of ten dif-
ferent client locations (same settings as M1). The re-
sults are shown in Figure 17. From these results we see
that the Cipollino client circuits provide more security
against AS-level traffic-correlation adversaries. Only
1.4% of all webpages loaded by the Cipollino client uti-
lized a vulnerable circuit, when compared to 11% and
57% for the Astoria and vanilla Tor clients, respectively.
Cipollino page-load times. To give a complete
picture of the performance of the Cipollino client we
consider the time required to load a complete web-page
(including third-party content). Figure 18 shows the
cumulative distribution of page-load times of 2000 web-
pages in ten client locations for the Cipollino, Astoria,
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and Tor clients. We find that the time required for load-
ing pages using the Cipollino and Tor client are quite
closely matched with the median page-load time differ-
ing by only 1.6 seconds, while the Astoria Tor client is
nearly 7 seconds slower.
6. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper we analyzed the threat faced by Tor
clients from AS-level adversaries from a current and his-
torical perspective. We found that the current threat is
high, with around 30% of all Tor circuits created in our
experiments remaining vulnerable to de-anonymization
by AS-level correlation attacks, regardless of whether
the Tor client is used for web browsing or other ap-
plications. Further, our historical analysis points to a
fundamental problem with the Tor network – the lack
of growth of AS-level diversity. Without specific efforts
from the Tor project to increase diversity of relays or
incorporate AS-awareness in the Tor client, our study
shows that the threat is bound to increase.
Our survey of previous work identified five common
pitfalls associated with the design and construction of
AS-aware Tor clients. We show how each of these pit-
falls results in high under-estimation of the threat from
AS-level adversaries, or increased vulnerability to active
(AS-level) and passive (relay-level) adversaries, or poor
performance characteristics.
We find that our AS-aware Tor client – Cipollino,
designed specifically to address these pitfalls improves
the current state-of-the-art by achieving better security
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against network-level adversaries. Specifically, by us-
ing a data- and control-plane measurement infrastruc-
ture whenever possible, Cipollino reduces the fraction
of vulnerable webpage loads from 57% (vanilla Tor)
and 11% (Astoria) to 1.4%. Additionally, by incor-
porating the concept of circuit pre-building and cir-
cuit re-use, the Cipollino client significantly reduces the
threat faced from malicious relays. As a consequence of
circuit pre-building and re-use, the Cipollino client is
also able achieve performance characteristics compara-
ble with the vanilla Tor client.
Data and source-code release: In an effort to en-
able reproducibility and ease future comparative evalu-
ation efforts, the following resources will be made avail-
able on acceptance of this work: the Cipollino Tor client,
the destination-based graphs provided by PathCache
during the time of this study, and the Web and mixed-
application user-models used in our simulations.
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